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Abstract  
Since the passage of the ADA, the question of who counts as 
disabled has been a heavily contested legal issue. Within this context, 
individuals who claim that their weight constitutes a disability 
challenge stereotypes of disabled people as innocent, unfortunate 
victims of personal tragedy. Their claims highlight both the tension 
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manuscript. 
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between the social and medical models of disability, which are 
intertwined in the ADA, and the ways in which perceptions and 
stereotypes, rather than impaired bodies, can create disability. 
Drawing on theoretical insights from fat studies literature, this 
article examines the circumstances under which courts conclude that 
being fat is a status that deserves anti-discrimination protection 
under the ADA. Using content analysis and logistic regression 
models, I find that fat plaintiffs fared worse (1) when their claims 
were based on perceived (rather than actual) disability and (2) when 
courts required them to prove the underlying cause of their weight. 
Findings suggest that the social model of disability has not been 
fully implemented under the ADA, and fat and disability rights 
activists must carefully consider the way they frame cases to prevent 
the perpetuation of negative stereotypes of individuals in both 
categories. 
Introduction 
In 1990, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) to protect the rights of people with disabilities.1 Over the 
next twelve years the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of the law, 
effectively diminishing the ADA’s power.2 During the same period, 
there was significant public outcry against the law based on two 
assumptions: that it provided disabled people unfair benefits and 
that it unduly burdened businesses.3 Due to both these judicial 
decisions and the political climate, a heated debate emerged in the 
legal community about who counts as disabled under the law.4 
Individuals not typically considered disabled, such as fat people,5 
were a focal point of this controversy. This study assesses whether 
 
 1. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)–(4). 
 2. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Toyota Motor Mfg., 
Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002). 
 3. See MARY JOHNSON, MAKE THEM GO AWAY: CLINT EASTWOOD, CHRISTOPHER 
REEVE & THE CASE AGAINST DISABILITY RIGHTS (2003). 
 4. See BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS 
(Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2003) [hereinafter BACKLASH]. 
 5. I use the word “fat” as a descriptor, following many fat studies scholars who 
want the word to become just an ordinary term similar to “tall” or “dark-haired.” 
Medical researchers, the media, and legal actors overwhelmingly use the terms 
“obese” or “overweight” and thus I sometimes use those terms when engaging with 
these mainstream contexts. Additionally, I use both “people with disabilities” and 
“disabled people,” interchangeably. See Erin E. Andrews, Anjali J. Forber-Pratt, 
Linda R. Mona, Emily M. Lund, Carrie R. Pilarski & Rochelle Balter, #SaytheWord: 
A Disability Culture Commentary on the Erasure of “Disability”, 64 REHABILITATION 
PSYCHOL. 111 (2019); Barbara J. King, ‘Disabled’: Just #SayTheWord, NPR, (Feb. 
25, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/13.7/2016/02/25/468073722/disabled-just-
saytheword [https://perma.cc/X6MX-PP4M]. 
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fat is an ADA-protected status in the realm of employment 
discrimination and examines the judicial reasoning underlying the 
pertinent court decisions. The results reveal that courts continue to 
use disability status to differentiate between individuals deemed 
worthy of social support, such as the anti-discrimination protection 
examined in this paper, and those considered undeserving. Further, 
judges tend to use a medical model of disability, rather than a social 
model, to demarcate the line between the deserving and the 
undeserving; specifically, judges reinforce the medical model of 
disability by focusing on determining an underlying medical cause 
for a person’s impairment. 
The ADA defines disability according to a hybrid social–
medical model. Under the ADA, disability is defined as “a physical 
or mental impairment that substantially limits [a] major life 
activit[y].”6 Importantly, however, a person is considered disabled 
either if they actually have such an impairment or if they are 
perceived as having one.7 Thus, the definition itself recognizes the 
importance of stereotypes and perceptions in creating the 
experience of disability.8 Beginning in the late 1990s, the Supreme 
Court interpreted this definition quite narrowly, and thus excluded 
people with a variety of impairments from the statute’s protection, 
including any person whose impairment could be mitigated through 
medication, prosthesis, or other forms of treatment, such as 
individuals with diabetes, epilepsy, mobility impairments, back 
problems, and even polio survivors.9 By excluding these individuals 
from the category of disability, the court effectively ruled that 
discrimination on the basis of these conditions was permissible. 
In making these determinations, the courts relied on 
traditional understandings and common-sense stereotypes of 
disability as a condition of dependency, helplessness, inability, and 
lack—the very stereotypes the ADA sought to change10—to decide 
who was deserving of disability-based anti-discrimination 
 
 6. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). 
 7. Id. § 12102(1)(A)–(C). 
 8. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) app. (2012) (“This third prong of the definition of 
disability was originally intended to express Congress’s understanding that 
‘unfounded concerns, mistaken beliefs, fears, myths, or prejudice about disabilities 
are often just as disabling as actual impairments, and [its] corresponding desire to 
prohibit discrimination founded on such perceptions.’ 2008 Senate Statement of 
Managers at 9.”). 
 9. See SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE 
DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 35–37 (2009); Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the 
ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 26–27 (2000). 
 10. See Wendy E. Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating Measures: Judicial 
Construction of the Meaning of Disability, in BACKLASH, supra note 4, at 122–23. 
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protection. In response to these decisions (which many scholars 
have characterized as a “judicial backlash”), Congress passed the 
ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) in 2008, which explicitly 
overturned the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding the definition 
of disability.11 The ADAAA affirmed that the ADA should be 
interpreted in a way that provides protection to a broad range of 
disabled people.12 In addition, the Amendments Act sought to shift 
the focus of legal disputes from the detailed analysis of an 
individual’s bodily limitations to the evaluation of claims of 
discrimination and the determination of the reasonableness of 
potential accommodations.13 Even after the passage of these 
amendments, however, the issue of which conditions count as 
legally protected disabilities continues to be a subject of debate 
among legal scholars as well as a frequent focus of court rulings.14 
Within this context of judicial skepticism toward disability 
claims, the court experiences of fat individuals serve as a fruitful 
arena for examining the legal reasoning around disability. In these 
lawsuits, stereotypes of fat and stereotypes of disability clash and 
judges draw on competing logics of personhood to determine who is 
“truly disabled.”15 This article employs a mixed-methods approach, 
combining content analysis and regression modeling to identify 
which factors influence judicial decisions pertaining to whether fat 
is classified as a disability under the ADA, decisions that have 
important implications for social justice. Defining fat as a disability 
allows fat individuals to fight employment discrimination via 
currently existing legislation, shifts blame from individuals to social 
structure, and highlights the way in which prejudicial attitudes 
create disablement. 
I develop my argument as follows: First, I review the pertinent 
literature; this summary includes a discussion of the scholarly 
insights from disability studies and fat studies, highlighting both 
tensions and overlap between these two fields, followed by an 
overview of the ADA, the judicial backlash against the ADA, and 
 
 11. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 § 2(a)(3)–
(7); see generally BACKLASH, supra note 4 (discussing judicial and societal backlash 
against the ADA). 
 12. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 
§ 2(b)(1). 
 13. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 
§ 2(b)(6). 
 14. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 9; Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Examination 
of Case Outcomes under the ADA Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027 
(2013). 
 15. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 9, at 38. 
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key judicial decisions about whether fat is a disability. Second, I 
describe the data and methodology used in the study. Third, I 
present the empirical results. Finally, I conclude with a discussion 
of the significance of the findings for political activism around fat 
rights, the need for disability rights activists to carefully consider 
the ways in which anti-discrimination litigation medicalizes 
disability, and the barriers that stereotypes continue to pose for 
both fat and disabled people seeking equal treatment in the 
employment sector. 
I. Literature Review 
A. Disability Studies 
Traditionally, disability has been understood as bodily lack, 
excess, or flaw; as a personal tragedy; and as a medical problem.16 
Disability studies scholars assert that moving past medicalized 
assessments would benefit all disabled people.17 Both historically 
and currently, disability serves as a category to distinguish between 
the deserving and undeserving poor, and medicine plays a key role 
in making this distinction.18 When the rise of industrial factories 
and the standardization of the pace and modes of production left no 
room for impaired people to participate in the labor market, 
institutions, such as the poorhouse and workhouse, arose to house 
individuals who could not work.19 In this context, disability came to 
serve as a proxy for worthiness, used to distinguish between those 
who could not work and those who would not work.20 The 
medicalization of disability played a key role in this process by 
acting as a legitimating device capable of identifying and 
distinguishing between able-bodied workers who were shirking 
their duties and blameless disabled people. Disabled people were 
 
 16. Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, Misfits: A Feminist Materialist Disability 
Concept, 26 HYPATIA 591, 591 (2011). See generally THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER 
(Lennard Davis ed., 5th ed. 2017); MICHAEL OLIVER, THE POLITICS OF DISABLEMENT 
(1990). 
 17. See, e.g., PETER CONRAD, THE MEDICALIZATION OF SOCIETY: ON THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF HUMAN CONDITIONS INTO TREATABLE DISORDERS 148–61 
(2007). See generally THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER, supra note 16. 
 18. See RUTH O’BRIEN, CRIPPLED JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF MODERN DISABILITY 
POLICY IN THE WORKPLACE (2001); DEBORAH A. STONE, THE DISABLED STATE (1984). 
 19. See Vic Finkelstein, Disability and the Helper/Helped Relationship: An 
Historical View, in HANDICAP IN A SOCIAL WORLD (Ann Brechin, Penny Liddiard & 
John Swain eds., 1981); BRENDAN GLEESON, GEOGRAPHIES OF DISABILITY 99–126 
(1997); OLIVER, supra note 16. 
 20. See O’BRIEN, supra note 18; STONE, supra note 18, at 32–39. 
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viewed as incapable of work and therefore deserving of support.21 
Unfortunately, this medicalized perspective continues to hinder 
disabled people today; the ADA has not improved disabled people’s 
high rates of unemployment,22 and disability rights advocates 
continue to fight stereotypes of disabled people as juvenile, 
innocent, and unable to work. 
The disability studies literature seeks to shift this 
understanding to a conception “of disability as a social construction 
whose meaning is determined primarily through discourse,” power, 
and knowledge.23 An early step in this movement was the 
development of the social model of disability,24 which separates 
impairment and disability (similar to the sex/gender distinction 
developed by feminist scholars).25 Impairment refers to the 
abnormal body, whereas disability arises from a specific type of 
societal organization that excludes and devalues impaired people.26  
This shift from understanding disability as a personal tragedy to 
understanding disability as a problem of social justice was 
“theoretically groundbreaking”27 and the latter remains the 
primary conception employed by disability rights activists today. 
The ADA and ADAAA implement the social model of disability by 
including individuals who are “perceived” or “regarded” as disabled 
(i.e., those who are disabled by the prejudices of others) within the 
law’s protection—these individuals’ disabilities do not arise directly 
from their bodies, but rather from the stereotypes held by others.28 
 
 21. See Finkelstein, supra note 19; GLEESON, supra note 19; OLIVER, supra note 
16; Marta Russell & Ravi Malhotra, Capitalism and Disability, 38 SOCIALIST REG. 
211 (2002). 
 22. See Michelle Maroto & David Pettinicchio, The Limitations of Disability 
Antidiscrimination Legislation: Policymaking and the Economic Well-being of People 
with Disabilities, 36 L. & POL’Y 370, 370–71 (2014). 
 23. See SIMI LINTON, CLAIMING DISABILITY: KNOWLEDGE AND IDENTITY (1998); 
Garland-Thomson, supra note 16, at 591. 
 24. See OLIVER, supra note 16, at 78–94. 
 25. GAYLE S. RUBIN, DEVIATIONS: A GAYLE RUBIN READER 39 (2011) (describing 
“sex” as the “biological raw material of human sex and procreation” and “gender” as 
the “human, social intervention” that relentlessly rearranges “sex” for society into 
social conventions). 
 26. E.g. OLIVER, supra note 16, at 78–94; but see TOBIN SIEBERS, DISABILITY 
THEORY (2008); Tom Shakespeare, The Social Model of Disability, in THE DISABILITY 
STUDIES READER, supra note 16 (arguing that both impairment and disability are 
socially constructed and that the social model discounts the embodied experience of 
impairment or disability). 
 27. See Garland-Thomson, supra note 16 at 592. 
 28. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A); ADAAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 
3554 § 4(a)(3); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) app. (2012) (“Nor is it necessary to 
demonstrate that the impairment relied on by a covered entity is (in the case of an 
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In the disability studies literature, disability encompasses a 
broad range of bodily differences. As scholar Rosemarie Garland-
Thomson explained, “In short, the concept of disability unites a 
heterogeneous group of people whose only commonality is being 
considered abnormal.”29 Disability studies scholars tend to consider 
fat a disability both because negative stereotypes and cultural 
myths surround fat bodies and because inaccessible social 
structures may impose actual limitations on a fat body. Garland-
Thomson and Lennard Davis, two of the most well-known disability 
studies scholars, have argued that fat should be considered a 
disability—for example, Lennard Davis wrote that the outcome in 
Cook (a First Circuit ruling considering morbid obesity to be a 
disability) “led to an enlightened land”30—and most scholars in the 
field follow this recommendation. This categorization of fat as a 
disability relies directly on the social model of disability, in which 
disability arises from both stereotypes, such as contempt for 
abnormal bodies, and social structures. Garland-Thomson 
concluded that “[t]he fat body is disabled because it is discriminated 
against in two ways: first, fat bodies are subordinated by a built 
environment that excludes them; second, fat bodies are seen as 
unfortunate and contemptible.”31 
B. Fat Studies 
For fat studies scholars and activists, the fit between fat and 
disability is somewhat more complicated. Fat studies arose out of 
the work of grassroots political organizing and seeks to bring these 
 
actual impairment) or would be (in the case of a perceived impairment) substantially 
limiting for an individual to be ‘regarded as having such an impairment.’ In short, to 
qualify for coverage under the ‘regarded as’ prong, an individual is not subject to any 
functional test. See 2008 Senate Statement of Managers at 13.”). 
 29. Rosemarie Garland‐Thomson, Re-shaping, Re-thinking, Re-defining: 
Feminist Disability Studies at 2, in BARBARA WAXMAN FIDUCCIA PAPERS ON WOMEN 
AND GIRLS WITH DISABILITIES (Ctr. for Women Pol’y Stud., 2001), 
https://www.womenenabled.org/pdfs/Garland-Thomson,Rosemarie,Redefining 
FeministDisabilitiesStudiesCWPR2001.pdf [https://perma.cc/HAL2-E4VF]. 
 30. Still, there is more work to be done. Lennard J. Davis, Bending Over 
Backwards: Disability, Narcissism, and the Law, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 193, 
211 (2000) (citing Cook v. R.I., Dep’t of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hosps., 10 
F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993)) (“While the plaintiff in Cook ultimately prevailed amid this 
orgy of purple prose and the journey of the court led to an enlightened land, the 
metaphors used still tell us that the court is out there in the dark. Despite the heroic 
efforts of this decision and the self-referential congratulations for this exploration 
and bringing of light to the darkness, which perhaps comprehendeth it not, the basic 
problem remains.”). 
 31. Rosemarie Garland‐Thomson, Feminist Disability Studies, 30 SIGNS: J. OF 
WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC’Y 1557, 1582 (2005). 
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radical politics into the academy.32 The discipline unites work from 
a variety of fields based on a shared focus on critiquing the negative 
stereotypes and stigma placed on the fat body.33 Contemporary 
cultural discourses portray fat bodies as ugly, lazy, and unhealthy.34 
Sociologist Abigail Saguy suggested that the current dominant 
discourse frames fat as a public health crisis caused by a lack of 
personal responsibility.35 Samantha Kwan and Jennifer Graves 
referenced both the health frame and the aesthetic frame, 
concluding that “current cultural discourses stigmatize fat bodies 
as ugly and unhealthy.”36 Fat studies scholars seek to subvert these 
dominant perspectives, asserting that fat bodies can be both healthy 
and beautiful. In addition, the field questions the prevalent 
assumption that weight is mutable and controllable.37 
Fat individuals living in the context of the widespread anti-fat 
culture of the United States face discrimination, prejudice, and 
mistreatment in many aspects of their lives.38 The stigma 
surrounding obesity limits social, educational, and employment 
opportunities.39 This bias develops early in life—researchers have 
found that “children would rather play with other children who had 
missing legs or eyes than children who were obese; adults would 
rather be deaf or blind than fat.”40 Further, people report that if 
given the choice, they would prefer to be of normal weight and poor 
than fat and a millionaire.41 Fat Americans may be less likely to 
attend prestigious schools, obtain desirable professions, and receive 
equal pay for their work.42 
 
 32. See MARILYN WANN, FAT! SO? (1998). 
 33. See SONDRA SOLOVAY, TIPPING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: FIGHTING WEIGHT-
BASED DISCRIMINATION (2000). 
 34. See SAMANTHA KWAN & JENNIFER GRAVES, FRAMING FAT. COMPETING 
CONSTRUCTIONS IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE (2013); ABIGAIL C. SAGUY, WHAT’S 
WRONG WITH FAT? (2014). 
 35. See SAGUY, supra note 34. 
 36. See KWAN & GRAVES, supra note 34, at 101. 
 37. See Esther D. Rothblum, Why a Journal on Fat Studies?, 1 FAT STUD. 3, 4 
(2012) (“[F]at activists felt that the terms ‘overweight,’ ‘underweight,’ and ‘normal 
weight’ all imply that there is an attainable ‘ideal’ weight when in fact there is a 
great diversity in weight.”). 
 38. Jane Korn, Too Fat, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & LAW 220–23 (2009). 
 39. Id. at 221. 
 40. Id. (citing ELLEN RUPPEL SHELL, THE HUNGRY GENE: THE INSIDE STORY OF 
THE OBESITY INDUSTRY 18–19 (2002)). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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Fat has been subjected to medicalization43 through its 
association with medical problems such as osteoarthritis, cancer, 
cardiovascular disease, diabetes, gallbladder disease, hypertension, 
infertility, liver disease, pancreatitis, and sleep apnea.44 According 
to a 1998 report by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), obesity 
(excess fat) is “a complex multifactorial chronic disease” caused by 
“social, behavioral, physiological, metabolic, cellular, and 
molecular” factors.45 Critical scholars have begun to research the 
role of environmental toxins such as endocrine disrupters (which 
are present in many products and foods) in individuals’ weight gain 
as well as the faulty assumptions in many of the studies that have 
found a correlation between fat and negative health outcomes.46 For 
example, in a series of experiments conducted with mice, scientists 
found that although both the control and experimental groups were 
given the same amount of food and exercise, the latter group, which 
was exposed to endocrine disrupters, gained more weight.47 These 
studies suggest, at the very least, that the cause of an individual’s 
body size is up for debate. Finally, no studies using a large enough 
sample to permit generalization have demonstrated that long-term 
weight loss is possible or improves health.48 
Thus, both fat and disabled people have bodies that are subject 
to medicalization, stigma, and structural or architectural exclusion. 
Like people with “traditional” disabilities, people who are fat 
encounter limitations in public places such as when they do not fit 
into spaces designed for average-sized people. For example, “[t]hey 
may not fit in the seats in a movie theatre; they may not be able to 
fit into a chair in a restaurant or on a ride in an amusement park.”49 
Lawyer and fat studies scholar Sondra Solovay argued that severely 
 
 43. CONRAD, supra note 17, at 4 (“‘Medicalization’ describes a process by which 
nonmedical problems become defined and treated as medical problems, usually in 
terms of illness and disorders.”). 
 44. Overweight & Obesity Statistics, 2017 NAT’L INST. OF DIABETES & DIGESTIVE 
& KIDNEY DISEASES (2017), https://www.niddk.nih.gov/health-information/health-
statistics/overweight-obesity [https://perma.cc/587H-S584]; NHLBI OBESITY EDUC. 
INITIATIVE EXPERT PANEL ON THE IDENTIFICATION, EVALUATION, AND TREATMENT OF 
OBESITY IN ADULTS (US), CLINICAL GUIDELINES ON THE IDENTIFICATION, 
EVALUATION, AND TREATMENT OF OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY IN ADULTS xi, 19 (1998) 
[hereinafter NHLBI OBESITY EDUC. INITIATIVE]. 
 45. NHLBI OBESITY EDUC. INITIATIVE, supra note 44, at 27. 
 46. See JULIE GUTHMAN, WEIGHING IN: OBESITY, FOOD JUSTICE, AND THE LIMITS 
OF CAPITALISM (2012); SAGUY, supra note 34. 
 47. GUTHMAN, supra note 46. 
 48. Paul Campos, Abigail Saguy, Paul Ernsberger & Eric Oliver, The 
Epidemiology of Overweight and Obesity: Public Health Crisis or Moral Panic?, 35 
INT’L J. OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 55 (2005). 
 49. Korn, supra note 38, at 226–27. 
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obese people “are substantially limited in a major life activity that 
the average person has no difficulty with—navigating all places of 
public accommodation during the course of an ordinary day.”50 
Several fat studies scholars have examined the connections 
between fat and disability, highlighting the shared experience of 
stigma. Charlotte Cooper described how the social model of 
disability spoke to her own experience of fatness, remarking, “[f]at 
and disabled people encounter discrimination in all areas of our 
lives, from our families, from strangers on the street, in the 
workplace and in society, where we are constantly reminded that 
there is something wrong with us.”51 Cooper found commonalities 
between fat and disabled people in terms of physical access (fitting 
into spaces), experiences of shame and pity, a lack of appropriate 
media representation, and a shared “low social status.”52 Lucy 
Aphramor also identified parallels between the two groups, 
describing similarities in discrimination against fat job applicants 
and little people applying for jobs: in both instances, discrimination 
is related to stereotypical beliefs about abilities and fear of 
customers’ negative reactions.53 April Herndon made a parallel 
comparison between disability and fat, in this case exploring 
discrimination toward fat and Deaf people.54 Finally, two recent 
theoretical articles suggested that fatness can be considered a 
disability.55 
Despite the similarities between these models of fat and 
disability, fat activists have not generally aligned themselves under 
the umbrella of disability, instead seeking to pass size-based anti-
discrimination laws.56 Fat rights activists explain this approach as 
reflecting a desire not to be associated with the characteristics 
 
 50. SOLOVAY, supra note 33, at 148. 
 51. Charlotte Cooper, Can a Fat Woman Call Herself Disabled?, 12 DISABILITY 
& SOC’Y 31, 36 (1997). 
 52. Id. at 32, 36. 
 53. Lucy Aphramor, Disability and the Anti‐obesity Offensive, 24 DISABILITY & 
SOC’Y 897, 903 (2009). 
 54. See April Herndon, Disparate but Disabled: Fat Embodiment and Disability 
Studies, 14 NWSA J. 120 (2002). 
 55. See Toby Brandon & Gary Pritchard, ‘Being Fat’: A Conceptual Analysis 
Using Three Models of Disability, 26 DISABILITY & SOC’Y 79 (2011); Nathan Kai‐
Cheong Chan & Allison C. Gillick, Fatness as a Disability: Questions of Personal and 
Group Identity, 24 DISABILITY & SOC’Y 231 (2009). 
 56. See ANNA KIRKLAND, FAT RIGHTS: DILEMMAS OF DIFFERENCE AND 
PERSONHOOD (2008) [hereinafter FAT RIGHTS]; Anna Kirkland, What’s at Stake in 
Fatness as a Disability?, 26 DISABILITY STUD. Q. 1 (2006); Anna Kirkland, Think of 
the Hippopotamus: Rights Consciousness in the Fat Acceptance Movement, 42 L. & 
SOC’Y REV. 397 (2008) [hereinafter Think of the Hippopotamus]; SAGUY, supra note 
34. 
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stereotypical of disability: lack, dependency, and inability.57 For 
example, in her interviews with fat rights activists, Kirkland found 
that they resisted an association with disability “because it 
complicated their arguments that fat people are fully functional and 
healthy.”58 In an exception to this pattern, activist Marilyn Wann 
suggested that using the disability label was a pragmatic choice, 
observing that “[i]n the dark times, you use whatever you have.”59 
Overall, however, fat rights advocates have rejected the disability 
label because of its continued medicalization, which construes the 
problem of disability as arising from the body’s limitations.60 Fat 
activists see the fat body as healthy and beautiful—problems result 
not from fat bodies, but rather from society’s negative response to 
fat people. This view aligns with a strong version of the social model 
of disability embodied by the ADA, in which disability arises not 
from the impaired body, but from society’s reaction to such bodies. 
One final perspective on the way fat fits, sometimes uneasily, 
as a disability is related to what Kirkland has called “logics of 
personhood,” which are defined as “the ways we talk to each 
other . . . about whether a person’s difference should matter for 
what she deserves, and why.”61 Anti-discrimination protection for 
disabled people has been justified by historical discrimination and 
segregation, as well as the view that their differences do not 
materially affect their ability to work.62 In Fat Rights, Kirkland 
attempted to fit fat within the overall field of anti-discrimination 
law by examining logics of personhood. For example, the logic of 
actuarial personhood can justify race and gender protections.63 
Because these traits relate primarily to appearance and do not 
change an individual’s functional ability, an employer should ignore 
these traits and focus on the abilities of the worker. However, this 
logic does not apply to someone who has a functional difference, 
such as an employee who uses a wheelchair and may require a sink 
to be lowered in the bathroom or a fat employee who may need a 
chair without armrests. In these cases, courts use a different logic 
of personhood, which Kirkland calls managerial individualism and 
defines as “a process-focused, context-specific approach to 
 
 57. Kirkland, What’s at Stake in Fatness as a Disability?, supra note 56; 
Kirkland, Think of the Hippopotamus, supra note 56. 
 58. Kirkland, Think of the Hippopotamus, supra note 56, at 417. 
 59. Id. at 420 (quoting Marilyn Wann). 
 60. Id. at 422. 
 61. FAT RIGHTS, supra note 56, at 27. 
 62. Id. at 40–41. 
 63. Id. at 20–23. 
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differences that requires an organization to do something to 
accommodate the person with a disability.”64 Kirkland suggested 
that the logic of managerial individualism (a focus on the unique 
qualities of individual bodies and personal accommodations) 
depoliticizes identity groups, and that, in practice, including fat 
people within the ADA’s category of disability would further 
medicalize fat and hinder the affirmatory politics desired by fat 
activists.65 Specifically, under the ADA, fat people would be subject 
to the same medicalized court assessments of their “functional 
capacities” as other disabled people.66 
Cases in which fat is alleged to be a disability reveal the 
differences between stereotypes of disabled people—who are 
perceived as deserving of pity or as unfortunate victims, helpless, 
and unable to work in or contribute to the labor market—and 
stereotypes of fat people—who are perceived as lazy, blameworthy, 
and victims of their lack of self-control rather than victims of bad 
luck. The pity reserved for disabled people in U.S. culture is not 
usually extended to fat people.67 Studying fat as disability 
highlights the way that these stereotypes and the resulting 
prejudice, as well as physical architectural barriers, construct the 
experience of disability. Disability studies scholars assert that the 
devaluation of bodies considered “abnormal” constitutes a barrier to 
the social inclusion of disabled people and to the formation of an 
identity category based on bodily abnormalities.68 Even when an 
individual obtains physical access to a space, the behaviors and 
attitudes of others may effectively eliminate the accessibility of the 
space. 
C. Passage of the ADA and Subsequent Backlash 
The ADA seeks to remedy the historical isolation, segregation, 
and discrimination that people with disabilities have encountered 
and to reaffirm the right of people with disabilities to participate 
 
 64. Id. at 22. 
 65. Id. at 133. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See SUSAN BORDO, UNBEARABLE WEIGHT: FEMINISM, WESTERN CULTURE AND 
THE BODY 185–86 (Tenth Anniversary ed., 2003) (describing the “massive and 
multifaceted nature” of the industries built to promote slender bodies and how 
preoccupation with fat pushes women especially to police their own bodies). 
 68. See, e.g., Irving Kenneth Zola, Bringing Our Bodies and Ourselves Back In: 
Reflections on a Past, Present, and Future “Medical Sociology”, 32 J. HEALTH & SOC. 
BEHAV. 1 (1991); Nick Watson, Well, I Know This Is Going to Sound Very Strange to 
You, but I Don’t See Myself as a Disabled Person: Identity and Disability, 17 
DISABILITY & SOC’Y 509 (2002). 
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fully in all aspects of society.69 Passed with bipartisan support in 
1990, top liberal and conservative supporters framed the bill as a 
way to move disabled people off of welfare and into the workforce. 
The ADA received such broad support because it appealed to both 
conservative cost-cutting interests and the liberal impetus to 
increase anti-discrimination protections.70  
The ADA’s language is not particularly revolutionary or 
different from the language used in other anti-discrimination laws, 
yet the law provides a unique legal solution. Under the ADA, 
employers must provide disabled workers with reasonable 
accommodations necessary for them to be effective in their jobs.71 
Unlike other anti-discrimination laws, which only provide 
monetary damages, the ADA gives workers the power to change 
their workplace environment to meet their needs and forces 
employers to adapt business practices to better serve their 
workers.72 
Soon after its passage, courts began interpreting the ADA in 
ways that stripped it of its potential.73 Specifically, courts narrowed 
the ADA’s definition of disability to restrict the potential impact of 
the law by limiting the number of people it protected.74 Ruth Colker 
provided empirical evidence of this restriction. According to Colker, 
from 1992 to 1998, 93 percent of ADA employment discrimination 
cases were decided in favor of employers, most often because 
employees were not considered disabled as defined by the ADA.75 
The ADA implements a hybrid medical–social model of 
disability. Although the preamble of the legislation explicitly 
recognizes that disability arises from certain social relations rather 
than being the automatic outcome of having an impaired body,76 
 
 69. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1)–(8) (1990). 
 70. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 9, at 5 (observing that “[b]oth liberal and 
conservative supporters of the ADA tapped into authentic aspects of disability rights 
thinking” and that “[t]hose aspects converged in support for the statute as it 
proceeded through Congress.”); BACKLASH, supra note 4, at 273 (noting the ADA is 
supported by “the liberal terms of equal rights” and by “conservative cost-efficiency 
rationales.”). 
 71. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A)–(B). 
 72. See Befort, supra note 14; Diller, supra note 9, at 39–47. 
 73. See BACKLASH, supra note 4. 
 74. See BACKLASH, supra note 4; BAGENSTOS, supra note 9; Diller, supra note 9, 
at 26–27. 
 75. Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 
34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 100 (1999); see also Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing 
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239 (2001). 
 76. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2012) (“[P]hysical or mental disabilities in no way 
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legal analysis continues to focus on an individual’s body as the site 
of disability. Under the ADA:  
 
The term “disability” means, with respect to an individual—  
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;  
(B) a record of such an impairment; or  
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.77  
 
This definition serves a gate-keeping function because meeting it is 
a threshold issue for employee-litigants in determining whether 
they are protected by the ADA.78 An individual “who does not 
qualify as disabled * * * does not meet th[e] threshold question of 
coverage in the protected class and is therefore not permitted to 
attempt to prove his or her claim of discriminatory treatment.”79 
In defining disability, the ADA attempts to move away from a 
strict medical understanding of disability. Determining whether an 
individual is disabled under the statute is supposed to be an 
individualized assessment based on a person’s specific abilities and 
not a medical diagnosis.80 There is no inherent or “per se” 
disability.81 This individualized inquiry requires courts to move 
away from broad generalizations, stereotypes, and assumptions 
about disabled peoples’ abilities. In practice, however, stereotypes 
 
diminish a person’s right to fully participate in all aspects of society, yet many people 
with physical or mental disabilities have been precluded from doing so because of 
discrimination[.]”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101, § 2(a)(2), 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (“[I]n 
enacting the ADA, Congress recognized that physical and mental disabilities in no 
way diminish a person’s right to fully participate in all aspects of society, but that 
people with physical or mental disabilities are frequently precluded from doing so 
because of prejudice, antiquated attitudes, or the failure to remove societal and 
institutional barriers.”). 
 77. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)–(C) (2012). 
 78. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) app. (2012) (citing STATEMENT OF THE MANAGERS 
TO ACCOMPANY S. 3406, 110TH CONG. (2008) (“The first of these is the term 
‘disability.’ ‘This definition is of critical importance because as a threshold issue it 
determines whether an individual is covered by the ADA.’ 2008 Senate Statement of 
Managers at 6.”)). 
 79. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c) (2012) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 110-730 at 6 (2008)). 
 80. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(v) app. (2012) (“The comparison of an individual’s 
performance of a major life activity to the performance of the same major life activity 
by most people in the general population usually will not require scientific, medical, 
or statistical analysis. Nothing in this paragraph is intended, however, to prohibit 
the presentation of scientific, medical, or statistical evidence to make such a 
comparison where appropriate.”). 
 81. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3) app. (2012) (“As the regulations point out, disability 
is determined based on an individualized assessment. There is no ‘per se’ disability. 
However, as recognized in the regulations, the individualized assessment of some 
kinds of impairments will virtually always result in a determination of disability.”). 
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and medical diagnoses continue to play key roles in these 
individualized assessments. 
The third prong of the ADA’s definition, “being regarded as 
having such an impairment” recognizes the role stereotyping plays 
in excluding disabled people. This aspect of the ADA ’s disability 
definition is particularly important for non-traditionally disabled 
people, such as the fat people whose cases are examined in this 
study. Legislative history indicates that Congress intended this 
prong of the definition to address “unfounded concerns, mistaken 
beliefs, fears, myths, or prejudice about disabilities [which] are 
often just as disabling as actual impairments . . . .”82 The Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) uses the example of 
physical disfigurement to explain perceived disability: 
 
The third part of the definition protects individuals who are 
regarded and treated as though they have a substantially 
limiting disability, even though they may not have such an 
impairment. For example, this provision would protect a 
severely disfigured qualified individual from being denied 
employment because an employer feared the “negative 
reactions” of others.83 
 
In effect, a fat employee bringing a claim of perceived 
disability discrimination argues that the way others viewed and 
treated them based on their weight, rather than their weight in and 
of itself, made them disabled. 
A final critical aspect of the disability definition for fat 
employees is the word “impairment.” Although the ADA does not 
define impairment, various EEOC regulations do. For example, in 
the context of employment at the federal Institute of Museum and 
Library Services, a physical impairment is defined as “[a]ny 
physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or 
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: 
Neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, 
including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive; digestive; 
genitourinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine . . . .”84 In 
addition, the Appendix to the EEOC regulations includes language 
distinguishing impairments and other physical characteristics: 
“The definition of the term ‘impairment’ does not include physical 
 
 82. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) app. (2012). 
 83. The ADA: Questions and Answers, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N 
(May 1, 2002), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/adaqa1.cfm [https://perma.cc/ 
KP53-GL23]. 
 84. 45 C.F.R. § 1181.103(1). 
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characteristics such as eye color, hair color, left-handedness, or 
height, weight, or muscle tone that are within ‘normal’ range and are 
not the result of a physiological disorder.”85 Some courts have 
interpreted this guidance to mean that weights within the normal 
range can be an impairment if caused by a physiological disorder,86 
while others have held that to be an impairment, weight must be 
both outside the normal range and caused by a physiological 
disorder.87  
In 2008, Congress passed the ADAAA for the explicit purpose 
of reversing the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of who is 
considered disabled under the law.88 Congress urged courts to shift 
their focus from whether an individual is disabled “enough” under 
the law to issues such as whether a discriminatory act had occurred 
or whether the accommodations an individual requested were 
reasonable.89 The ADAAA eclipsed prior interpretations of the law 
and removed the substantial limitation requirement from the 
definition of a perceived disability.90 Under the new statute, a 
person is categorized as disabled if they are treated adversely 
 
 85. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) app. (2012) (emphasis added) (“It is important to 
distinguish between conditions that are impairments and physical, psychological, 
environmental, cultural, and economic characteristics that are not impairments.”). 
 86. See Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 810 (6th Cir. 1997) (suggesting that 
plaintiffs’ weights, which were not beyond a normal range, might be qualifying 
impairments if plaintiffs had “alleged that they suffer from a physiological disorder 
(which, for example, has produced excessive weight or lack of fitness despite their 
individual efforts)”); Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 286 (2nd Cir. 1997) 
(noting that simple (not morbid) obesity may be a qualifying impairment when it 
“relates to a physiological disorder”); Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F.Supp. 739, 
746 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (distinguishing a situation in which a plaintiff bodybuilder’s 
weight was in the normal range and exceeded an employer limit from a hypothetical 
case in “which the plaintiff’s weight was involuntary—e.g., the result of a glandular 
problem”). 
 87. See Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 810 (6th Cir. 1997); Francis v. City of 
Meridan, 129 F.3d 281, 286 (2nd Cir. 1997); EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, 463 F.3d 
436, 443 (6th Cir. 2006); Morriss v. BNSF Ry. Co., 817 F.3d 1104, 1111 (8th Cir. 
2016). 
 88. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 
§ 2(a)(3)–(7); BACKLASH, supra note 4. 
 89. Id. § 2(b)(4)–(6). 
 90. Id. § 2(b)(3)–(6); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) app. (2012) (“Accordingly, the 
ADA Amendments Act broadened the application of the ‘regarded as’ prong of the 
definition of disability. 2008 Senate Statement of Managers at 9-10. In doing so, 
Congress rejected court decisions that had required an individual to establish that a 
covered entity perceived him or her to have an impairment that substantially limited 
a major life activity. This provision is designed to restore Congress’s intent to allow 
individuals to establish coverage under the ‘regarded as’ prong by showing that they 
were treated adversely because of an impairment, without having to establish the 
covered entity’s beliefs concerning the severity of the impairment. Joint Hoyer-
Sensenbrenner Statement at 3.”). 
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because of an actual or perceived impairment.91 They do not need to 
prove that the impairment substantially limits a major life 
activity.92 At least one study has found that employees with a 
variety of disabilities have won a significantly higher proportion of 
cases since the passage of the ADAAA. In an examination of 237 
ADA decisions, Stephen F. Befort found that before the ADAAA, 
district courts decided nearly 75 percent of cases in favor of 
employers on the basis that the employees were not disabled, while 
after the ADAAA, only 46 percent of district court cases had similar 
outcomes.93 These results suggest that the ADAAA had its intended 
effect of applying the ADA’s protections to a broader range of 
employees. 
D. A Review of Case Law: Fat as Disability 
Under the ADA, eighteen cases94 alleging employment 
discrimination on the basis of fat have reached appellate courts (15 
before the application of the ADAAA and three after).95 These cases 
 
 91. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) app. (2012) (“To illustrate how straightforward 
application of the ‘regarded as’ prong is, if an employer refused to hire an applicant 
because of skin graft scars, the employer has regarded the applicant as an individual 
with a disability. Similarly, if an employer terminates an employee because he has 
cancer, the employer has regarded the employee as an individual with a disability.”). 
 92. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) app. (2012) (“In any case involving coverage solely 
under the ‘regarded as’ prong of the definition of ‘disability’ (e.g., cases where 
reasonable accommodation is not at issue), it is not necessary to determine whether 
an individual is ‘substantially limited’ in any major life activity. See 2008 Senate 
Statement of Managers at 10.”). 
 93. See Befort, supra note 14, at 2050–51. 
 94. Only ten of these decisions were published, and therefore, have precedential 
value. 
 95. See Cook v. R.I., Dep’t of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps., 10 F.3d 17 
(1st Cir. 1993); Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803 (6th Cir. 1997); Francis v. City of 
Meriden, 129 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 1997); Johnson v. Baylor Univ., 129 F.3d 607, No. 97-
50194, 1997 U.S. App. WL 680835 (5th Cir. Sept. 18, 1997); Watters v. Montgomery 
Cnty. Emergency Commc’n Dist., 129 F.3d 610, No. 97-20118, 1997 U.S. App. WL 
681143 (5th Cir. Oct. 13, 1997); Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n of Se. Pa., 168 F.3d 
661 (3d Cir. 1999) (not included in the sample because depression was the first 
claimed impairment); Pepperman v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 201 F.3d 436, 
No. 99-1366, 1999 U.S. App. WL 1082546 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 1999); McKibben v. 
Hamilton Cnty., 215 F.3d 1327, No. 99-3360, 2000 U.S. App. WL 761879 (6th Cir. 
May 30, 2000); Wilson v. Cap. Transp. Corp., 234 F.3d 29, No. 99-31156, 2000 U.S. 
App. WL 1568200 (5th Cir. Sept. 15, 2000); EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, 463 F.3d 
436 (6th Cir. 2007); Greenberg v. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 
2007); Bass v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 287 F. App’x 808, No. 08-10549, 2008 U.S. 
App. WL 2831988 (11th Cir. 2008); Cordero v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 300 F. App’x 
679, No. 08-11213, 2008 U.S. App. WL 4902656 (11th Cir. Nov. 17, 2008); Spiegel v. 
Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2010); Wilkerson v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1256 (10th 
Cir. 2010); Lescoe v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr.-SCI Frackville, 464 F. App’x 50, No. 11-2123, 
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have focused on two primary issues: First, is fat an impairment (i.e., 
a physiological disorder)? Second, does a person’s weight act as a 
substantial limitation? Importantly, many of these cases 
illuminated the role of stereotypes in disabling fat workers. Ten 
plaintiffs brought only claims of perceived disability, in effect 
arguing that being fat was a disability only because others 
perceived them as unable to do their jobs.96 The first case of 
employment discrimination based on fat as a disability to reach a 
federal court of appeals laid out a framework that was later 
employed in subsequent litigation. In this case, Bonnie Cook 
brought and won a claim of perceived disability, arguing that she 
was disabled because of the erroneous, stereotypical beliefs of her 
employer regarding her weight.97 Cook, an institutional attendant 
with a “spotless” work record, was not rehired after taking a 
voluntary leave because the hospital, her former employer, believed 
that her morbid obesity “compromised her ability to evacuate 
patients in case of an emergency and put her at greater risk of 
developing serious ailments . . . .”98 Although Cook did not claim 
that she, personally, was disabled by fat, she needed to prove that 
fat was an impairment that could form the basis of a claim of 
disability discrimination under the ADA.99 Thus, Cook presented 
expert testimony that morbid obesity is a “physiological disorder 
involving a dysfunction of both the metabolic system and the 
neurological appetite-suppressing signal system, capable of causing 
adverse effects within the musculoskeletal, respiratory, and 
cardiovascular systems.”100 In addition, Cook demonstrated that 
morbid obesity is immutable; her expert witness testified that 
metabolic dysfunction continues even after weight loss.101 
Other circuits interpreted Cook and the expert testimony 
presented in a variety of ways. The requirement that a fat litigant 
prove that their weight is (1) a physiological disorder itself or (2) 
caused by a physiological disorder shaped appellate decisions in the 
 
2012 U.S. App. WL 505896 (3d Cir. Feb. 16, 2012); Morriss v. BNSF Ry. Co., 817 
F.3d 1104 (8th Cir. 2016); Kelly v. Univ. of Pa. Health Sys., 708 F. App’x 60 (3d Cir. 
2017). 
 96. See Spiegel, 604 F.3d 72; Greenberg, 498 F.3d 1258; EEOC, 463 F.3d 436; 
Wilson, No. 99-31156, 2000 WL 1568200; Walton, 168 F.3d 661; Francis, 129 F.3d 
281; Watters, No. 97-20118, 1997 WL 681143; Johnson, No. 97-50194, 1997 WL 
680835; Andrews, 104 F.3d 803; Cook, 10 F.3d 17. 
 97. Cook, 10 F.3d at 22. 
 98. Id. at 20–21. 
 99. Id. at 23. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 24. 
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Second, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits.102 In 1997, the Second and Sixth 
Circuits decided cases in which firefighters and police officers, 
respectively, challenged weight limits.103 In both cases, the 
plaintiffs argued that their employers perceived them as disabled 
because they failed to meet weight limits.104 However, neither court 
affirmed that the plaintiffs were disabled. The Second Circuit 
concluded that the firefighters had not shown that their weights 
were related to a physiological condition and the Sixth Circuit found 
that the officers did not allege that their weights were out of the 
normal range or caused by a physiological condition. Notably, both 
the Second and Sixth Circuit rulings addressed obesity, but not 
morbid obesity.105 Both courts were concerned that extending the 
ADA to fat employees contradicted the law’s purpose.106 In 
justifying these decisions, the courts distinguished fat litigants 
from the “truly disabled,” arguing: 
 
The ADA “assures that truly disabled, but genuinely capable, 
individuals will not face discrimination in employment because 
of stereotypes about the insurmountability of their handicaps. 
It would debase this high purpose if the statutory protections 
available to those truly handicapped could be claimed by 
 
 102. Morriss v. BNSF Ry. Co., 817 F.3d 1104, 1112–13 (8th Cir. 2016) (“In sum, 
we conclude that for obesity, even morbid obesity, to be considered a physical 
impairment, it must result from an underlying physiological disorder or condition. 
This remains the standard even after enactment of the ADAAA, which did not affect 
the definition of physical impairment. Because Morriss failed to produce evidence 
that his obesity was the result of an underlying physiological disorder or condition, 
the district court properly concluded that Morriss did not have a physical 
impairment under the ADA.”); Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 
1997) (“Francis’s claim fails because obesity, except in special cases where the obesity 
relates to a physiological disorder, is not a ‘physical impairment’ within the meaning 
of the statutes.”); Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 810 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Because a 
mere physical characteristic does not, without more, equal a physiological disorder, 
where an employee’s failure to meet the employer’s job criteria is based solely on the 
possession of such a physical characteristic, the employee does not sufficiently allege 
a cause of action under these statutes.”). 
 103. Francis, 129 F.3d at 282; Andrews, 104 F.3d at 805–06. 
 104. Francis, 129 F.3d at 282; Andrews, 104 F.3d at 805–06. 
   105. Francis, 129 F.3d at 285 (“Francis only alleges that his employer disciplined 
him for failing to meet a general weight standard. He does not claim that his 
employer regarded him as suffering from a physiological weight-related disorder.”); 
Andrews, 104 F.3d at 810 (“The officers herein do not allege that their weights or 
their cardiovascular fitness are beyond a normal range, nor have they alleged that 
they suffer from a physiological disorder (which, for example, has produced 
excessive weight or lack of fitness despite their individual efforts).”). 
 106. Francis, 129 F.3d at 286; Andrews, 104 F.3d at 810 (“To hold otherwise would 
(to paraphrase the Fourth Circuit) distort the ‘concept of an impairment [which] 
implies a characteristic that is not commonplace’ and would thereby ‘debase [the] 
high purpose [of] the statutory protections available to those truly handicapped.’”). 
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anyone whose disability was minor and whose relative severity 
of impairment was widely shared.”107 
 
In 2006, the Sixth Circuit extended the requirement of proving 
a physiological cause to morbid obesity.108 More recently, the Eighth 
Circuit held that even after the ADAAA, employee-litigants must 
show that their morbid obesity is related to a physiological cause.109 
A second group of appellate decisions focused not on whether 
fat was an impairment or a physiological condition, but instead on 
whether fat was a substantial limitation for plaintiffs. As in the first 
group of cases, fat employees in these cases also brought claims of 
perceived disability, as highlighted by the unpublished Fifth Circuit 
case Johnson v. Baylor University.110 Johnson, a fat pilot, was 
terminated for failure to lose weight; Baylor University believed 
Johnson’s weight had a negative impact on potential university 
donors flying in his plane.111 As the court summarized, “Johnson’s 
position put him in contact with many important university 
benefactors and therefore required a certain comeliness on 
Johnson’s part that might not otherwise be required.”112 Johnson 
argued that his employer’s perception of him as disabled was the 
basis for his termination.113 The court concluded, however, that 
Johnson was not perceived as disabled, arguing that to prove this 
claim he would need to show that Baylor perceived him as being 
substantially limited in his ability to work in a broad range of jobs, 
not just jobs in which appearance must have a positive impact.114 
The Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have decided cases on 
similar grounds, finding that employees did not fit the disability 
definition because their impairments were not substantially 
limiting.115 
 
 107. Francis, 129 F.3d at 286 (quoting Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th 
Cir. 1986)). 
 108. EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, 463 F.3d 436, 443 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 109. Morriss v. BNSF Ry. Co., 817 F.3d 1104, 1111 (8th Cir. 2016). 
 110. Johnson v. Baylor Univ., No. 97-50194, 1997 WL 680835 (5th Cir. Sept. 18, 
1997). 
 111. Id. at *1. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at *3. 
 114. Id. at *4 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C)) (“The ‘regarded as,’ or ‘perception,’ 
prong of the ‘disability’ definition requires that a plaintiff provide evidence that the 
employer thought that other employers would not hire him because of his obesity.”). 
 115. Lescoe v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr.-SCI Frackville, No. 11-2123, 2012 WL 505896, at 
*2 (3d Cir. Feb. 16, 2012) (quoting Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 
185 (2002)) (“Although this Court has not definitively reached a position regarding 
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Since the Cook ruling, only the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits 
have treated fat as a disability under the ADA in published 
decisions.116 In an unpublished decision, the Third Circuit 
considered a plaintiff’s weight to be a protected disability; however, 
the plaintiff lost her case because her employer had articulated a 
non-discriminatory reason for her termination.117 Thus, only three 
circuits have precedential decisions considering fat a disability. 
Given these precedents, it is not surprising that most law review 
articles on this topic have concluded that fat is rarely considered a 
disability by courts.118 Further, these articles seem to assume 
 
whether obesity is a disability under the ADA that limits a major life activity, the 
District Court did not err in finding that Lescoe did not establish any major life 
activities that were adversely affected by his weight. He passed numerous medical 
and physical exams to obtain the position as well as a five-week training program. 
Moreover, Appellant ‘must further show that the limitation on the major life activity 
is substantial.’”); McKibben v. Hamilton Cnty., No. 99-3360, 2000 WL 761879, at *5 
(6th Cir. May 30, 2000) (“Although McKibben has not explicitly identified the 
‘regarded as’ prong under which he proceeds, his arguments fall under the first 
prong. He insists that his alleged ‘morbid obesity’ constitutes an impairment and 
that the defendants regarded his weight as substantially limiting the major life 
activity of working. We disagree. Even if his alleged ‘morbid obesity’ qualifies as a 
physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit the major life 
activity of working, McKibben has not offered any evidence that the defendants 
regarded his weight as such a substantial limitation.”); Greenberg v. Bellsouth 
Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1264 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Greenberg has not shown 
that he has an impairment that substantially limits him in one or more major life 
activities. First, a person is ‘substantially limited’ in a ‘major life activity’ if he cannot 
care for himself; on this point, the evidence indicates that Greenberg bathed and 
dressed himself and could perform household chores.”). 
 116. In so ruling, the Tenth Circuit explained: 
Here there are two potentially qualifying disabilities: obesity and diabetes. 
The question of whether the defendant is disabled was not decided by the 
district court. The district court stated that: ‘For the sole purpose of 
determining whether summary judgment is appropriate in this case, this 
Court will . . . assume that Plaintiff has met his burden in proving that he 
is a disabled person.’ . . . . On appeal, neither side has fully briefed this 
question nor is there a record on which to base a decision on whether Mr. 
Wilkerson is disabled. Further, we find other aspects of the analysis 
dispositive. Thus, like the district court, we will assume that Mr. Wilkerson 
has met this prong of the analysis. 
Wilkerson v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1256, 1262–63 (10th Cir. 2010). See also Bass v. 
Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 08-10549, 2008 WL 2831988, at *3 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that Bass did not show that the proffered reasons for his termination were 
pretextual). 
 117. Kelly v. Univ. of Pa. Health Sys., 708 F. App’x 60, 63–64 (3d Cir. Sept. 11, 
2017). 
 118. See, e.g., M. Neil Browne, Virginia Morrison, Barbara Keeley & Mark 
Gromko, Obesity as a Protected Category: The Complexity of Personal Responsibility 
for Physical Attributes, 14 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 1, 20 (2010) (“[O]bese plaintiffs 
alleging employment discrimination under the ADA or RHA have been met with 
fervent opposition.”); Jeffrey Garcia, Weight-Based Discrimination and the 
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common-sense understandings of fat and disability, such as the 
notion that individuals are not at fault for being disabled but are at 
fault for being fat, rather than understandings put forth by 
disability and fat studies scholars.119 
 
Americans with Disabilities Act: Is There an End in Sight?, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 
209, 228 (1995) (“In most cases, however, excess weight, without a related medical 
condition or other impairment, has not been considered a handicap.”); Carol R. 
Buxton, Obesity and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 4 BARRY L. REV. 109, 127 
(2003) (“Unless obesity is determined to be a disease, the Americans with Disabilities 
Act is not the place for the obese to seek shelter, with the exception of the perceived 
disability prong.”); Patricia Hartnett, Nature or Nurture, Lifestyle or Fate: 
Employment Discrimination Against Obese Workers, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 807, 821 
(1993) (“Though the proposed regulations acknowledge that obese plaintiffs may 
argue that their status constitutes a disability protected by the ADA, the Act states 
that it is generally not to be construed as providing such protection.”); Abigail Kozel, 
Large and in Charge of Their Employment Discrimination Destiny: Whether Obese 
Americans Now Qualify as Disabled Under the Americans with Disability Act 
Amendments Act of 2008, 31 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 273, 327 (2009) (“Before 
2009, essentially no claims for protection under an obesity-as-a-disability ADA 
protection stood a chance of success.”); Elizabeth Kristen, Addressing the Problem of 
Weight Discrimination in Employment, 90 CAL. L. REV. 57, 81 (2002) (“[C]ourts have 
been generally unsympathetic to claims by fat plaintiffs under the [ADA] and the 
Rehabilitation Act.”); Shannon Liu, Obesity as an “Impairment” for Employment 
Discrimination Purposes Under the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act 
of 2008, 20 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 141, 166 (2010) (“[P]ast case law has not considered 
obese individuals as disabled or obesity as an impairment for ADA purposes.”); Amie 
A. Thompson, Obesity as a Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
Amendments Act and the Amendments’ Effect on Obesity Claims Under the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act: Should Employers Anticipate a Big Change?, 12 
DUQ. BUS. L.J. 259, 271 (2010) (“[M]ost [courts] that have addressed the argument 
[that obesity is a handicap or disability] have found it unpersuasive.”). But see, e.g., 
Elizabeth E. Theran, “Free to Be Arbitrary and . . . Capricious”: Weight-Based 
Discrimination and the Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 11 CORNELL J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 113 (2001) (arguing that more courts will likely find obesity a protected 
disability). 
 119. For example, as Browne, Morrison, Keeley and Gromko describe: 
  The cause of obesity properly plays a major role in our response to the 
treatment of obese persons under the law. In the extreme, suppose obesity 
were akin to childhood cancer. As a community, we would see the obese as 
vulnerable, as humans in need of our legal and financial sympathy. 
  On the other hand, suppose obesity is similar to the effects of choosing 
to walk into the direct path of a raging rhinoceros. While we might want to 
claim that no one could make such a choice, there is too much extant 
evidence that many, and quite seemingly sensible, people make choices that 
have almost certain destructive consequences. 
  In this latter instance, wherein obesity is the result of voluntary choices 
that reasonable people should understand as having severe consequences, 
the legal reaction to obesity would be to hold people accountable for their 
actions. We would treat the obese as responsible adults who knowingly 
chose a lifestyle of which obesity was a highly probable result. Thus, the 
obese should face the consequences of their actions, just as should anyone 
whose choices we sanction. 
Browne et al., supra note 118, at 39–40. For other examples, see also: 
Imagine a healthy, active man who is involved in a tragic car accident. The 
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II.  Methods 
A. Sample 
To collect this data set, I conducted multiple searches of 
Westlaw (a database used by legal scholars to collect and examine 
legal documents, including judicial opinions) using the key terms 
“obesity,” “obese,” “morbid obesity,” “fat,” and “Americans with 
Disabilities Act.” These searches produced a list of hundreds of 
cases, which I then refined by retaining only those brought under 
the ADA and excluding cases brought under state and other anti-
discrimination statutes.120 I further narrowed the sample by 
focusing on instances of employment discrimination, which is a 
common practice in ADA research and ensures that cases share a 
similar underlying structure and present similar claims.121 Finally, 
I restricted the sample to cases in which obesity or morbid obesity 
was the primary claimed impairment, excluding cases in which fat 
was included as part of a list of four or more medical diagnoses.122 
 
accident leaves him paralyzed from the waist down and he can no longer 
walk. He remains as active as he possibly can, with the aid of his wheelchair. 
Medical technology, as advanced as it has become, cannot restore the use of 
his legs. Compare him to a five-foot six-inch woman who began gaining 
weight at the age of eighteen. By the time she is 22, her weight has swelled 
to 385 pounds. Most likely due to her large body size, she is constantly 
hungry and sometimes eats six meals a day—mostly at fast food 
restaurants. 
  Unlike the man in the wheelchair, she can change her condition, and she 
did. Under a doctor’s supervision, she changed her eating habits and began 
an exercise routine. In the span of fifteen months, she lost one hundred 
pounds. Though at times difficult and seemingly impossible, she worked 
towards her goal and was able to achieve it. Now ask that man in a 
wheelchair what he would be willing to do to walk again. One can only guess 
what his answer would be. Congress seemingly recognized the immutability 
of a disability and the need for a law to protect the truly disabled. 
Buxton, supra note 118, at 113; Kristen, supra note 118, at 82 (“[U]sing disability 
antidiscrimination laws is problematic from an ideological perspective, since most 
fat people would argue that they are not disabled and are in fact perfectly capable of 
doing the same work as thin people.”). 
 120. I also included cases brought under the Rehabilitation Act because this is the 
statute under which federal employees bring claims of disability employment 
discrimination. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–797 (2018). 
 121. See generally Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for 
Defendants, supra note 75 (studying outcomes in ADA employment discrimination 
cases); Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, supra 
note 75 (finding that plaintiffs bringing disability claims in court are more successful 
if their discrimination is charged with the EEOC). 
 122. For example, I excluded the Third Circuit decision in Walton v. Mental 
Health Ass’n of Southeastern Pennsylvania because Walton’s primary impairment is 
depression. See Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n of Se. Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 665 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
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This process resulted in a data set of eighty-seven cases that 
occurred between 1993 and 2018. The data include every judicial 
opinion available on Westlaw in which fat was the primary claimed 
disability in an ADA employment lawsuit from 1990 to 2018. Unlike 
traditional legal research, the sample includes both commonly cited 
appellate cases and more obscure district court opinions. In 
addition, the sample includes unreported opinions (i.e., opinions 
that the ruling court regarded as having insufficient precedential 
value and thus are not available for citation as legal precedent).123 
The final sample includes cases from all twelve circuits, or legal 
regions. Each circuit is legally independent from the others, 
although the ADA, as a federal statute, applies equally in each 
region. An appellate court decision in a circuit sets the legal 
interpretation for lower district courts to follow, but the high courts 
in other circuits may interpret the ADA differently. 
The sample has three notable limitations. First, relatively few 
acts of employment discrimination result in litigation124 and the 
majority of cases settle out of court.125 Therefore, this study of case 
law may not be representative of all disability discrimination in the 
workplace. Second, the sample does not include claims brought 
under state disability anti-discrimination statutes or claims 
seeking disability supplemental security income (SSI) benefits or 
workers’ compensation. This choice was strategic. Although the 
extant research suggests that the ADA has not increased disabled 
people’s employment rates126 and that most people who bring cases 
under the ADA lose them,127 scholars have found that the ADA 
holds symbolic meaning for many disabled people, even those who 
do not actively use the law.128 Finally, not all states and circuits are 
 
 123. The lack of precedent does not affect the current analysis, which focuses not 
on legal precedent, but on how the ADA disability definition is applied to fat 
employee-litigants. 
 124. See Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: 
Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 L. & SOC’Y REV. 525, 545 (1980). 
 125. See Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson & Ryon Lancaster, Individual 
Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation in 
the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175 (2010). 
 126. See Maroto & Pettinicchio, supra note 22, at 373. 
 127. See Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 
supra note 75, at 100. 
 128. E.g., DAVID ENGEL & FRANK MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND 
IDENTITY IN THE LIFE STORIES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES (2003) 
(demonstrating how the ADA plays a role in the positive identity formation of some 
disabled Americans). Based on in-depth interviews, Engel and Munger found that 
disability rights affirmed their respondents’ belief in themselves as capable people 
and changed their thinking about their bodily difference. As a federal civil rights 
statute, the ADA may hold even more symbolic power in shaping disability identity. 
2021] Fat and Disability 179 
equally represented in the sample, most likely due to specific state 
and municipal laws. The sample includes only one case from 
Michigan and no cases from California. The lack of cases from 
Michigan is likely the result of a state law prohibiting weight-based 
discrimination under which lawyers could bring a claim (Michigan 
is the only state with such a law).129 Similarly, the absence of cases 
from California is likely the result of lawyers being able to bring 
claims under multiple municipal laws.130 Municipalities in New 
York, Wisconsin, Illinois, and the District of Columbia also have 
weight-based protections that may have influenced the shape of this 
sample.131 
B. Coding 
I coded each legal opinion for the type of disability claim made 
by employees: actual disability, perceived disability, or both. I also 
coded for the year, court circuit (region), procedural stance, 
intersectional claims, expert witness testimony, and the primary 
legal issue. With respect to plaintiffs’ demographic characteristics, 
I coded for gender, occupation, and weight (morbid or simple 
obesity). The dependent variable is whether the court considered 
the plaintiff disabled, which is a preliminary requirement to 
receiving anti-discrimination protection under the ADA. Because 
the research question examines whether fat is a disability under the 
ADA, the analysis focuses on the disability determination rather 
than whether the plaintiff won or lost the claim. To ensure inter-
coder reliability, a second attorney reviewed and coded a random 
sample of 10 percent of the cases. There was full agreement between 
coders on all variables. 
C. Variables 
Many of the variables, such as procedural posture, year, and 
circuit, were explicitly listed in judicial opinions. Others required a 
further step to determine; for example, gender was identified 
through pronoun usage and first names. I coded opinions for weight 
by categorizing plaintiffs as either obese or morbidly obese, based 
 
 129. See Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 37.2101–2803 
(West 1976). See also Equality at Every Size, NAT’L ASS’N TO ADVANCE FAT 
ACCEPTANCE, (September 18, 2020), https://naafa.org/eaes [https://perma.cc/6Z7A-
ZLBD]. 
 130. See Equality at Every Size, supra note 129 (describing both the San Francisco 
Administrative Code and the Santa Cruz Municipal Code). 
 131. Id. (discussing legal protections in Binghamton, NY; Madison, WI; Urbana, 
IL; and Washington, DC). 
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on the height/weight listed in the opinion or the courts’ language 
use (e.g., describing a plaintiff as morbidly obese). Although fat 
studies scholars use the simple descriptor “fat,” judicial opinions 
exclusively employed the medicalized terms “obese” and “morbidly 
obese.” In three cases I could not determine whether an employee 
was considered obese or morbidly obese;132 in the rest of the sample, 
sixty-four individuals were categorized as morbidly obese and 
twenty were categorized as obese. The variable “expert witness” 
identified cases in which the plaintiff presented testimony from a 
medical expert, physician, or nurse regarding their impairment or 
limitations. Using the coding system developed by Jonsson et. al., 
occupation was coded as either manual or non-manual and as 
belonging to one of ten meso-classes (classical professions, 
managers and officials, other professions, sales, clerical, craft, lower 
manual, service workers, primary [agriculture], or proprietors);133 
in three cases, I was unable to identify the plaintiff’s occupation.134 
Because prior research has found that employee-litigants who 
bring intersectional claims (more than one identity-based claim of 
discrimination) fare worse than those who bring single-focus 
claims,135 I coded for whether the plaintiffs brought claims based on 
gender, racial, or age discrimination as well as disability. The 
independent variable for claim type (actual disability, perceived 
disability, or both) was easily determined based on court analysis 
in most cases, but I was unable to determine claim type in three 
cases.136 In addition, I coded for the dispositive legal issue (the issue 
 
 132. See Lowe v. Am. Eurocopter, LLC., No. 1:10CV24–A–D, 2010 WL 5232523, 
at *6 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 16, 2010) (“Plaintiff claims that she is disabled due to her 
weight.”); Marsh v. Sunoco, Inc., No. 06-CV-2856, 2006 WL 3589053, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 
Dec. 6, 2006) (“Plaintiff alleges that Sunoco regarded him as disabled on account of 
his weight and discriminated against him on that basis in violation of the ADA.”); 
Watters v. Montgomery Cnty. Emergency Commc’n Dist., 129 F.3d 610, No. 97-
20118, 1997 WL 681143, at *2 (5th Cir. Oct. 13, 1997) (“In her Second Amended 
Original Complaint, Watters claims that she was perceived ‘to be disabled because 
of her weight’ and that her weight was perceived as severely restricting her ‘ability 
to perform various job related tasks.’”). 
 133. Jan O. Jonsson, David B. Grusky, Matthew Di Carlo, Reinhard Pollak & 
Mary C. Brinton, Microclass Mobility: Social Reproduction in Four Countries, 114 
AM. J. SOCIO. 977, 997 (2009). 
 134. See Smaw v. Va. Dep’t of State Police, 862 F. Supp. 1469 (E.D. Va. 1994); 
Funk v. Purdue Emps. Fed. Credit Union, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (N.D. Ind. 2004); 
Bird v. County of Greene, No. 06-1281, 2007 WL 626106 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2007). 
 135. See Rachel Kahn Best, Linda Hamilton Krieger, Lauren B. Edelman & Scott 
R. Eliason, Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of Intersectionality Theory in 
EEO Litigation, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 991, 994–95 (2011). 
 136. See Franz v. Kernan, 951 F. Supp. 159 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Redd v. Rubin, 34 
F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1998); Willis v. San Antonio ISD, No. SA-16-CA-00887-ESC, 
2017 WL 3470944 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2017).  
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on which the case was decided): whether the plaintiff’s fat was a 
physiological condition, whether the plaintiff was substantially 
limited, whether discrimination occurred, or another issue. Finally, 
I created dummy variables to control for precedent; these variables 
categorized circuits as having positive appellate decisions (a ruling 
that fat was a disability), no appellate decisions, or negative 
appellate decisions (a ruling that fat was not a disability). 
The dependent variable, whether the court ultimately 
considered the plaintiff disabled or non-disabled, was based on a 
close reading of the judicial opinions. In some of the cases coded as 
disabled (fourteen cases, or sixteen percent of the sample), the court 
did not directly rule that the specific employees were disabled, but 
rather “assumed” that these employees were disabled as defined by 
the law in order to analyze the remainder of their legal claims. 
Determining whether an employee-litigant is disabled as defined by 
the law is a threshold issue—to evaluate a claim of discrimination, 
the court must necessarily consider a person disabled, otherwise the 
law would simply not apply to the situation. Courts that assume 
employees are disabled to proceed with an evaluation of their claims 
of discrimination are following Congress’ intention, as expressed in 
the ADAAA, that the determination of disability “not demand 
extensive analysis . . . .”137 Thus, these cases were coded as disabled. 
In contrast, in cases that were coded as not disabled, the courts had 
explicitly ruled that the ADA did not apply to a specific plaintiff 
because they were not disabled. 
D. Analysis 
I conducted two logistic regression models because “this is the 
standard procedure for analyzing binary dependent variables.”138 
The relatively small sample size placed constraints on the 
multivariate statistical analyses due to limited degrees of freedom 
and low statistical power. Because of these challenges, the inclusion 
of a large number of independent variables in the models would 
have reduced statistical efficiency and almost certainly ensured 
that no factors would have a significant effect. Therefore, I selected 
control variables particularly carefully. 
 
 137. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 
§ 2(b)(5) (“[T]o convey that it is the intent of Congress that the primary object of 
attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether entities covered under 
the ADA have complied with their obligations, and to convey that the question of 
whether an individual’s impairment is a disability under the ADA should not 
demand extensive analysis . . . .”). 
 138. See Richard York, Kyoto Protocol Participation: A Demographic Explanation, 
24 POPULATION RSCH. & POL’Y REV. 513, 520 (2005). 
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III. Results 
Table 1 includes a list of all cases in the sample as well as the 
year and region in which the final decision was published. The table 
also shows the types of claims made by employees (perceived/actual) 
and whether the court considered the employee disabled under the 
ADA. In addition, the percentage of employees considered disabled 
is listed next to the circuit name. 
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Table 1: All Cases by Circuit with Year, Claim Type, and 
Disability Decision 
First Circuit (75%) Second Circuit (54%) Third Circuit (60%) 
Cook 1993, P 
Nedder 1995, P A 
Ridge 1999, P 





Smallwood 1995, A 
Francis 1997, P 
Hazeldine 1997, A 
Butterfield 1998, P A 
Furst 1999, P A 
Honey 2002, A 
Connor 2003, P 
Warner 2003, P 
Alfano 2006, P A 
Spiegel 2006, P 
Caruso 2008, P A 
Frank 2010, P A 














Motto 1997, P 
Polesnak 1997, P 
McCarron 2001, A 
Goodman 2005, P 
Marsh 2006, P 
Bird 2007, A 
Ni 2010, A 
Lescoe 2011, P A 
Clem^ 2017, P A 











Fourth Circuit (20%) Fifth Circuit (55%) Sixth Circuit (29%) 
Smaw 1994, P A 
Pepperman 1999, A 
Hill 2009, P A 
Michaels 2011, A 






Texas Bus 1996, P 
Johnson 1997, P 
Watters 1997, P 
Wilson 2000, P 
Whaley 2002, P 
Magnant 2006, A 
Melson 2009, A 
Tedford 2010, A 
Lowe^ 2010, P A 
Resources^ 2011, P 












Andrews 1997, P 
Miller 1997, A 
McKibben 2000, P 
Brantley 2006, A 
Cox 2006, A 
Watkins 2006, P 








Seventh Circuit (45%) Eighth Circuit (50%) Ninth Circuit (67%) 
Bryant 1997, P 
Clemons 1997, P 
Bochenek 1998, P A 
Zarek 1998, P 
Funk 2004, P A 
Barrett 2009, A 
Revolinski 2011, P A 
Budzban 2013, A 
Luster-Malone 2013, A 
Richardson^ 2017, P 












Morrow 1996, A 
Franz 1996, - 
Fredergill 1997, P 
King 2000, P A 
Whittaker^ 2014, P A 







Beem 2011, A 
Hayes 2011, A 




Tenth Circuit (100%) Eleventh Circuit (33%) D.C. Circuit (100%) 
McDonald 1995, A 
Wilkerson 2010, A 




Barnett 1997, A 
Murray 1999, P 
Coleman 2000, P A 
West 2000, A 
Cordero 2007, A 
Dale 2007, P 
Greenberg 2007, P A 
Bass 2008, A 
Cristia 2008, P A 
Middleton 2008, P A 
Powell^ 2014, P A 













Redd 1998, - 
Bunyon 2002, A 
D 
D 
NOTE: ^ indicates that the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 applied. D indicates that the 
court treated an employee as disabled and reviewed the rest of the claim. N indicates a 
determination that the employee was not disabled. P refers to a claim of perceived 
disability, A refers to a claim of actual disability, and R refers to having a record of 
disability. – indicates that the court opinion did not explain whether an employee-litigant 
brought a perceived or actual disability claim. The percentage of cases in which employees 
were deemed disabled is listed next to each circuit heading. 
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The opinions were split evenly, with employees considered 
disabled by the courts in 50.57 percent of the cases and explicitly 
deemed not disabled as defined by the ADA in 49.43 percent of the 
cases. The percentage of employees considered disabled varied 
dramatically across circuits, however, from 20 percent in the Fourth 
Circuit to 100 percent in the Tenth Circuit. In eight of the twelve 
regions or circuits, 50 percent or more of employees were considered 
disabled under the ADA; three of these circuits had published 
appellate court decisions ruling that an obese or morbidly obese 
employee was not disabled.139 
There was also variation in disability determinations over 
time. In the first decade covered in the study, 1990 to 2000, thirty-
three cases were brought, and 42 percent of these employee-
litigants were considered disabled. From 2001 to 2008, twenty-four 
cases were brought, and 50 percent of employee-litigants were 
considered disabled. Finally, from 2009 to 2018, thirty cases were 
brought, and 60 percent of these employee-litigants were deemed 
disabled under the law. These fluctuations over time may reflect 
Supreme Court decisions and the 2008 passage of the ADAAA by 
Congress (the potential effects of these events are discussed in more 
detail below). Among cases decided after the amendments act went 
into effect on January 1, 2009, the rate of employees deemed 
disabled rose to 64 percent (nine out of fourteen cases).  
  
 
 139. See Francis v. City of Meridan, 129 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 1997); Spiegel v. 
Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2010); Lescoe v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr.-SCI Frackville, 
464 F. App’x 50 (3d Cir. 2012); Morriss v. BNSF Ry. Co., 817 F.3d 1104 (8th Cir. 
2016). 
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Only Actual Claim 1.164 (0.571)*  
Only Perceived Claim -0.127 (0.613)  
Positive Appellate Decision 0.437 (0.558)  
Period 1993–2000 -0.573 (0.591) -0.790 (0.659) 
Period 2001–2008 -0.278 (0.597) -0.196 (0.711) 
Period 2009–2018 (reference)   
Any Appellate Decision  0.408 (0.596) 
Physiological Cause  -3.013 (0.726)* 
Substantial Limitation  -2.284 (0.603)* 
Constant -0.217 (0.499) 1.517 (0.585) 
N 84 87 
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.263 
*p  <  .05   
 
The regression models revealed three statistically significant 
variables: bringing only an actual (as opposed to a perceived) 
disability claim, a court focus on physiological condition, and a court 
focus on substantial limitation. Some seemingly important 
variables, including gender, occupation, bringing intersectional 
claims, and providing expert witness testimony, were not 
statistically significant in the models. However, given the small 
sample size, these results do not necessarily indicate that these 
factors are not relevant. 
In Model 1, bringing only a claim of actual disability increased 
the likelihood that a plaintiff would be considered disabled by the 
courts. Negative appellate decisions did not have a statistically 
significant effect. Claim type (perceived disability, actual disability, 
or both) was statistically significant in many iterations of Model 1, 
suggesting that courts have struggled to understand the social 
model of disability, in which disability can and does arise when 
individuals act on stereotypical beliefs. 
Model 2 confirmed that both aspects of the ADA’s disability 
definition (1—possession of physical or mental impairment; 2—
substantial limitation of major life activities) pose significant 
hurdles for fat plaintiffs. The requirement in certain districts that 
plaintiffs present expert testimony that their weight either (1) is a 
physiological condition or disorder or (2) is caused by such a 
condition or disorder hindered plaintiffs’ claims that their weight is 
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a physical impairment. When this type of medicalization was the 
primary legal issue, as it was in twenty cases, plaintiffs were 
significantly less likely to be deemed disabled by a court. To my 
knowledge, this requirement is unique to fat plaintiffs (although 
there are no parallel studies in which researchers analyzed all or 
most cases for other specific categories of disability) and likely 
reflects the pervasive influence of negative stereotypes that portray 
fat as a character flaw rather than a medically neutral impairment. 
A comparison to prior research140 and legal scholarship141 
shows that with respect to the second aspect of the ADA’s definition 
of disability (substantial limitation of major life activities), fat 
plaintiffs fared similarly to other potentially disabled people. When 
courts focused on this aspect of the disability definition (relative to 
the impairment aspect), fat litigants were significantly less likely to 
be considered disabled under the ADA. However, this finding may 
be less important in the future because the ADAAA specifically 
sought to lower the bar for proving a substantial limitation. Of the 
twenty-six cases in the sample that focused on substantial 
limitations, only six occurred after the passage of the ADAAA. 
Because the ADAAA did not, however, change the definition of 
impairment, determining whether fat is a physiological condition 
may remain an obstacle for fat plaintiffs. 
IV. Discussion 
Since the passage of the ADA in 1990, courts have struggled 
to determine whether obesity is an ADA-protected disability. The 
finding that 50 percent of employee-litigants were considered 
disabled and thus legally protected, while 50 percent were not, 
highlights the lack of a legal consensus on this issue. This result 
may also represent a failure to equitably apply the ADA to similarly 
situated employees, although the pattern makes sense in the 
context of the ADA’s mandate that courts individually assess a 
plaintiff’s condition. Further, the results align with prior empirical 
studies of the ADA, which have found that prior to the ADAAA, 
most people bringing a claim of disability employment 
discrimination lost because courts did not consider them 
 
 140. See Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 
supra note 75; Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, supra note 75; Befort, supra note 14. 
 141. See BACKLASH, supra note 4; O’BRIEN, supra note 18. See, e.g., BAGENSTOS, 
supra note 9 (examining the definition of “disabled” through the creation of disability 
law). 
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disabled.142 While the experiences of fat employees who bring ADA 
claims is typical of ADA employee claimants overall—courts have 
struggled to determine the disability status of employees with a 
variety of impairments—the requirement that an individual prove 
an underlying cause for their impairment appears to be unique to 
fat plaintiffs. This requirement, along with judicial reluctance to 
accept fat people’s claims of perceived disability, suggests that 
traditional, individualized, and medicalized understandings of 
disability continue to hold sway in the courts. Within these 
traditional perspectives, disability is understood as arising from an 
individual’s body rather than social structures; this understanding 
allows space for anti-fat stereotypes to influence legal judgments. 
Employee-litigants who argued that they were actually 
disabled by their fat, and not just stereotyped as disabled, were 
more likely to be considered disabled by the courts and thus covered 
by the ADA. Their weight may have substantially limited their 
abilities more than the weights of employees bringing only 
perceived disability claims. However, weight was not a statistically 
significant predictor of disability outcomes, and the content 
analysis revealed no relationship between weight and the likelihood 
of being considered disabled. Alternatively, courts may have been 
more comfortable with actual disability claims because these claims 
reflect common-sense ideas of disability (i.e., that a disability is 
primarily the result of an individual’s physical deficit). Claims of 
perceived disability, in contrast, reflect the social model of disability 
(espoused by disability rights activists, scholars, and parts of the 
ADA itself) in which the major limitations of disability arise because 
of societal discrimination, prejudice, and stereotyping. The 
limitations resulting from the physical impairment itself are less 
important in the social model. This understanding of disability has 
not yet overtaken more traditional perspectives in mainstream 
society. Fat studies argues for a strong version of the social model, 
asserting that nothing is inherently wrong with fat. Instead, fat 
becomes a limitation when others perceive it to be a character flaw, 
a moral failing, or a sign of an individual’s weakness. 
These perceptions of fatness likely underlie some of the courts’ 
requirements to prove that a person’s weight is a physiological 
condition or is caused by a physiological condition. The ADA and 
Rehabilitation Act have no requirement that employees must prove 
 
 142. See Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 
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the cause of their impairment.143 The EEOC regulations defining 
impairment state that a physical impairment is any physiological 
disorder (not something caused by a physiological disorder) that 
affects a major bodily function.144 Thus, this requirement seems to 
reflect judicial discomfort with the notion that fat individuals are 
disabled. Further, the notion that fat individuals contributed to 
their weight is not the only belief underlying this discomfort, as 
shown by the treatment of other conditions that can be caused by 
an individual’s conduct. Recent EEOC regulations include lists of 
expected ADA-protected disabilities (conditions that are usually, 
but not always, disabilities under the ADA) that are not 
traditionally thought of as disabilities and that may be caused by 
an individual’s conduct, such as diabetes, cancer, skin burns, and 
HIV.145 Indeed, many recognized disabilities may be caused in some 
part by an individual’s conduct. Sky-diving accidents can lead to 
mobility impairments, poor judgment can lead to amputations, Deaf 
people sometimes choose not to have curative surgery. Therefore, 
the requirement that an individual must prove the cause of their 
fatness may have less to do with actual causation and more to do 
with proving their deservingness. 
As Anna Kirkland argued in her analysis of logics of 
personhood, courts rely on different rationales to determine who is 
worthy and deserving of anti-discrimination protection.146 
Historically, disability has been used as a medicalized rationale to 
differentiate the undeserving and deserving poor. In the focal cases, 
courts turned to this medicalized tradition to determine whether fat 
employees are worthy of anti-discrimination protection. 
Specifically, some courts attempted to make this determination via 
the requirement of cause. Is fatness a trait that deserves protection? 
Or is it a trait that society should discourage by not providing legal 
protection? This shift toward the use of disability as a medicalized 
rationale is ironic, given the disability rights movement’s calls to 
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 144. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (2012). 
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move away from medicalized understandings of disability. More 
importantly, the view that fat people are not disabled hurts claims 
for social inclusion of traditionally disabled people by solidifying 
negative stereotypes about the “truly disabled.” 
Many of the courts that focused on identifying physiological 
causes stated in their decisions that it was the court’s role to 
distinguish the “truly disabled” from fat people, whose limitations 
were characterized as relatively minor.147 This understanding of 
disability contradicts the work of disability rights activists and 
scholars, as well as those involved in fat studies, in two ways. First, 
this perspective emphasizes a view of disabled people as radically 
different from non-disabled people because of the severity of their 
impairments, and it attempts to locate disability in the body, 
instead of in society. However, survey and interview data suggest 
that most people with disabilities identify stereotypes as the 
primary barrier they encounter, not limitations resulting from their 
impairment.148 Many disability studies scholars argue that disabled 
people do not want a cure for their impairments, they want access 
and equal treatment,149 which suggests that the impairments of 
people considered traditionally disabled are not as severe as 
commonly thought. Second, this understanding of disability ignores 
a key insight of the social model of disability. What counts as a 
disability will necessarily change over time because disability arises 
from the interaction of the social world and an impairment.150 
Therefore, definitions of disability must consider the way cultural 
values give rise to disability. At one moment in history, a society 
may view an impairment as a valuable difference while at another, 
it may view the same impairment as a tragedy or a defect. Under 
the social model of disability, an impairment becomes a disability 
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when society creates policies and structures that isolate, 
discriminate against, and culturally devalue the people who possess 
that physical characteristic. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, fat fits within a strong social model of disability, 
a model that truly understands that disability arises from cultural 
reactions to a devalued body, not the body itself. The ADA reflects 
a strong social model through the claim of perceived disability. As 
disability and fat rights advocates bring claims under the ADA, they 
should carefully consider whether to emphasize the physical 
limitations of their clients or the stereotypical understandings that 
create disabling limitations. Courts currently reward those who 
conform to traditional notions of disability as arising from the 
limited body, however, this representation of disability may not 
benefit the disability rights movement as a whole. Instead, it may 
further medicalize disability. Future research should examine fat-
as-a-disability determinations at the state level, within other 
federal statutes, and internationally. Although many states follow 
the ADA interpretations in analyzing state law claims, New York, 
which has found fat to be a covered disability in the past, is a 
notable exception.151 Further, the Canadian Transport Agency 
recently affirmed in an adjudication that fat could give rise to 
disability based on particular social structures and contexts.152 
Future research could identify more jurisdictions in which fat has 
been treated as a disability. Policy makers and disability rights 
activists should consider fat studies scholars’ assertions that there 
is nothing wrong with the fat body. This perspective aligns with 
research on disabled people’s lived experiences, which has shown 
that stereotypes are the primary barrier people report. Courts must 
move away from the current medicalized understanding of 
disability and recognize that, for both fat and disabled people, 
stereotypes give rise to disablement. 
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